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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the effect of the Hungarian disability quota - levy system on disabled employment and firm 
behavior, and also aims to shed light on factors influencing the effectiveness of employment tax incentives. 
According to the quota rule, firms above a certain size threshold have to employ at least five percent disabled 
employees or pay a levy in case of non-compliance. The special feature of the Hungarian quota system is the 
uniquely high levy, which is accompanied by poor labor market integration of the disabled. The estimation exploits 
two significant policy changes: the drastic raise of the levy in 2010 and the increase of the firm size threshold from 
20 to 25 employees in 2012. The policy effect on disabled employment is estimated on firm level data with 
regression discontinuity design. The baseline RDD results are adjusted to account for the potential bias arising from 
non-random firm selection, as many firms adjust their size to avoid the quota. The estimated disabled employment 
effect is high in international comparison, however, almost three-quarter of the quota is not fulfilled. I find evidence 
that the ratio of disabled population influences the disabled employment effect of the quota. This suggests that low 
effective labor supply and high (perceived) non-wage costs of hiring disabled are factors behind low quota 
fulfillment. 
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1 Introduction
The labor market integration of disabled population is a great challenge in all countries. In labor
market context, the concept of disability refers to a long term physical or mental health problem
that causes serious work limitation, and employment rates of the disabled are usually well below
the non-disabled population. Developed countries usually apply an arsenal of diﬀerent, supply
and demand side policies to boost the labor market integration of disabled individuals. Disability
quota system is a commonly used element of the toolkit that concentrates on the demand side.
Firms, usually above a certain size threshold have an obligation to employ a certain number of
disabled employees or pay a tax in case on non-compliance. Thus, the aim of quota-levy systems
is to enhance the labor market demand by increasing the relative cost of employing non-disabled
employees.
This paper evaluates the eﬀects of the Hungarian disability quota-levy system on employment
of disabled persons and ﬁrm behavior. In addition, exploiting the special features of the Hun-
garian quota-levy system, the paper also aims to reveal factors inﬂuencing the eﬀectiveness of the
policy. The Hungarian quota-levy system is peculiar in terms of the amount of levy compared to
wages, which has become one of the highest in the world after a dramatic, 454 percent increase
in the middle of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2010. A unique feature of the system is that the levy is
higher than the minimum wage cost of fulﬁlling the quota. Nevertheless, the quota fulﬁllment
can be considered rather low: more than 70 percent of ﬁrms above the threshold chooses paying
the levy instead of hiring a disabled employee. This paper aims to shed light on the roots of this
contradiction.
In addition to the drastical levy hike in 2010, the identiﬁcation of the quota employment eﬀect
exploits another policy change: the increase of the ﬁrm size threshold from 20 to 25 employees in
2012. Similarly to Lalive et al. (2013), Mori and Sakamoto (2017), Malo and Pagán (2014), in the
ﬁrst step the employment eﬀect of the quota was estimated by applying regression discontinuity
design (RDD), focusing on the years before and after the two reforms. I ﬁnd that ﬁrms react
quickly and intensively to the policy changes. Basic sharp RDD estimations show no signiﬁcant
discontinuity before the levy hike. However, in 2010, when the increase came into eﬀect, more
than quarter of the quota is fulﬁlled thanks to the regulation. A similarly large discontinuity
is estimated in 2012 at the increased, 25-employee threshold, while the discontinuity at the old
threshold disappears within a single year.
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However, probably attributable to the exceptionally high levy, Hungarian ﬁrms are more
inclined to change the size of their workforce in order to avoid the regulation than in other
countries, resulting in a solid bunching in ﬁrms' distribution below the quota threshold. The
bunching shifts upward with increasing the ﬁrm size threshold, conﬁrming that the observed
discontinuity in ﬁrms' distribution is related to the disabled quota. As the assumption of random
ﬁrm selection around the quota threshold is violated, baseline RDD might produce an upward
biased estimation of the treatment eﬀect. Firm size manipulation was also detected in the
Austrian case by Lalive et al. (2013), and they apply a back-of-the envelope method to calculate
lower and upper bounds for the treatment eﬀect. For the Hungarian case, where bunching is
more spectacular, I estimate the potential magnitude of the bias using a simulation method,
using an estimated counterfactual distribution to calculate the mass of ﬁrms that keep their size
below the threshold on account of the levy. The basic idea is based on the method Lalive et al.
(2013), and the estimation consists of the following steps. First a counterfactual distribution is
constructed by ﬁtting a power law on ﬁrm distribution, omitting observations near the threshold,
where the bunching takes place. The number of ﬁrms that keep their size below in order to
avoid the regulation ("bunchers") are calculated by comparing the counterfactual and the actual
ﬁrm distribution. In the following step, the calculated number of randomly selected ﬁrms are
moved above the threshold, that is a simulated sample is constructed such that the resulting
ﬁrm distribution is smooth. The lower bound of the quota's disabled employment eﬀect is the
average of treatment eﬀects of re-estimated RD from a simulation of 100 draws.
Results show that the bias caused by the bunching accounts for at most 40% of the estim-
ated disabled employment eﬀect, the quota strongly increases disabled employment even after
controlling for the potential endogeneity bias. The estimated elasticity of substitution between
disabled and non-disabled employees is also much higher than found in other countries, suggest-
ing that ﬁrms react very sensitively to ﬁnancial incentives. Regression discontinuity estimations
on ﬁrm characteristic and the composite covariate index indicates that selection of ﬁrms between
the treatment and control groups is based on non-observable ﬁrm characteristics. However, RD
estimations on diﬀerent subgroups of ﬁrms indicate that the disabled employment eﬀect at the
threshold strongly depends on ﬁrm characteristics. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms with lower average wages
are more inclined to hire disabled as an eﬀect of the quota, conﬁrming that the level of the levy
compared to the average wages inﬂuences the reaction of ﬁrms. I also ﬁnd evidence that the em-
ployment eﬀect of the quota is stronger in regions where the ratio of disabled population is higher.
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This shows that low eﬀective labor supply and high adjustment costs of hiring disabled might
be factors behind low quota fulﬁllment. The eﬀective labor supply of disabled is constrained
by many factors, for example lack of capacity in rehabilitation services or high opportunity
cost of working. High adjustment costs (cost of recruiting, workplace and job accommodation,
integration) and discrimination by employers also might play a role.
The few papers in the literature that study the eﬀects of disabled employment quota usually
ﬁnd positive, but moderate or insigniﬁcant eﬀect on disabled employment around the threshold,
however, in these cases, the levy is also moderate. The quota system is found to signiﬁcantly
increase disabled employment in Austria (Lalive et al. (2013), Wuellrich (2010)) and Japan
(Mori and Sakamoto (2017)). Malo and Pagán (2014) ﬁnd small positive employment eﬀect for
Spain that is signiﬁcant only at 10 % level,1 and Nazarov et al. (2015) conclude that changes in
the quota system in South-Korea (decrease in employment threshold and increase in ﬁne) have
increased labor market participation of disabled, but after controlling for selection into the labor
market, had only a limited impact on probability of being employed.
This paper primarily contributes to the quota literature by analyzing the eﬀects of a disabled
quota, when the ﬁnancial incentive is particularly strong. In addition to the signiﬁcant increase
in the levy, I can exploit another signiﬁcant policy change, the increase in the ﬁrm size threshold
from 20 to 25. The second policy change serves as a robustness check and strengthen the main
ﬁndings, as the policy eﬀect changes along with the shift in the threshold.
The paper is also related to the literature that analyzes the eﬀects of demand side employ-
ment policies, for example employer-side wage subsidies and other tax incentives, as the basic
mechanism of quota-levy systems is similar. Speciﬁcally, all these policies operate by decreasing
the relative wage cost of disadvantaged groups, thus the quota-levy system can be regarded as a
negative subsidy or tax incentive. Empirical evidence on wage subsidies is mixed: there is some
evidence that wage subsidies can be eﬀective in enhancing employment of disabled (Datta Gupta
et al. (2015)) and disadvantaged unemployed (Kluve (2010)), other papers ﬁnd that wage sub-
sidies have modest (Katz (1996), Hamersma (2008) or no eﬀect(Baert (2016)). Katz (1996)
highlights that elasticity of labor supply and other factors, such as administration costs, stig-
matization eﬀect and employer awareness also inﬂuence employment and wage eﬀects of wage
subsidies. However, little is known about the relevance of the diﬀerent factors empirically. This
paper contributes by showing that other factors beyond labor demand elasticity, such as labor
1However, there is no levy accompanied to the quota in the Spain case.
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supply constraints and labor market frictions might have a great inﬂuence on employment out-
comes. The example of Hungarian quota-levy suggests that applying strong ﬁnancial incentives
is not suﬃcient for achieving policy goals even if ﬁrms react sensitively to changes in relative
wage costs. Without addressing the underlying frictions on disabled labor market, the quota-levy
rather behaves like a size-related tax that puts a disproportional burden on low-wage ﬁrms.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. The second section describes the institu-
tional setup and mechanism of quota-levy system in Hungary. Section 3 describes the data that
are used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 shows the empirical strategy and results of regres-
sion discontinuity design. Section 5 shows ﬁrm heterogeneity in employment eﬀect and provides
evidence for the role of labor supply in the disabled employment eﬀect. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional background
The labor market position of disabled individuals (in Hungarian terminology: individuals with
changed working capacity) in Hungary seems to be particularly poor in international compar-
ison.2 The employment rate of disabled in Hungary is one of the lowest in the EU, and the
employment rate is only one third of that of the total working age population (see Appendix D,
Figure 12).3 The large discrepancy with other EU countries mainly comes from the very low
disabled activity rate, though the disabled unemployment rate is also excessive (see Appendix
D, Figure 13).
2.1 Disabled quota system in Hungary
Similarly to other countries, the Hungarian disabled employment policy applies a set of diﬀerent
tools: sheltered and subsidized employment, education, rehabilitation services (for a detailed
review, see for example Scharle and Varadi (2013), Scharle and Csillag (2016)). Disabled em-
ployment quota is one of the most common tools, which is applied in about one third of OECD
countries. OECD (2010). The aim of quota-levy systems is to enhance the labor demand for dis-
abled by increasing the relative cost of employing non-disabled employees. Firms, usually above
a certain size threshold have an obligation to employ a certain number of disabled employees
2International data are not completely comparable with data of our econometric analysis. Eurostat data are
based on the Labor Force Survey and the disabled status is assessed on the basis of self assessment and does not
imply oﬃcial qualiﬁcation automatically. However, these data give a picture about the magnitude of the problem.
3The employment rate is very low even after controlling for age and education diﬀerences between disabled
and non-disabled (source:Central Statistical Oﬃce).
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or pay a levy in case on non-compliance. The details - size threshold, levy compared to wages,
quota - diﬀer across the countries.
Employment quota has been in force in Hungary since 1991. According to the regulation,
practically all employers, ﬁrms and public institutions above a size threshold are obliged to
employ 5 percent of their average statistical headcount with a certiﬁcate of changed working
capacity.4 The status of changed working capacity is attained through a complex assessment
process implemented by the rehabilitation authority (National Oﬃce for Rehabilitation and So-
cial Aﬀairs, previously Institute of National Rehabilitation and Social Experts).5 If the number
of employed disabled is lower than the quota requirement, the ﬁrm is obliged to pay a levy (in
Hungarian terminology: rehabilitation contribution) for the missing persons from the quota.
The quota is 5 percent of the yearly average statistical headcount (for details of the yearly
average statistical headcount calculation, see Appendix A). The rehabilitation contribution has
to be paid for the diﬀerence between the number of disabled employees at the ﬁrm and the
obligatory employment level implied by the quota, that is 5 percent of the average headcount.
Working time of disabled employees must reach or exceed 20 hours per week to be considered
in the quota. However,once this minimum is attained, the working time is not relevant: a half-
time disabled employee is treated in a same way as a full-time disabled, that is regarded as a full
person in the quota.6
A specialty of the Hungarian regulation is that the quota is not rounded to an integer number,
but it is rounded to one decimal digit. (The same applies for data both in the denominator and
the numerator in the quota: the average headcount and the average number of disabled are
rounded to one decimal digit.) Thus, if the threshold is 20 employees, a ﬁrm with 25 employees
that employs one disabled still has to pay the levy for a quarter missing person, has to overﬁll
the quota if wants to avoid paying the levy. This rule implies that we can expect discontinuity in
the number of disabled workers only at the threshold (20 employees up to 2012 and 25 employees
4There are only a few exemptions, for example the organizations of Armed Forces. Additionally those who
employed in some special forms of communal and temporary employment also do not count toward the headcount
of the company, that is the base of the rehabilitation contribution. First, the rehabilitation contribution was
regulated in the ACT IV. of 1991 on Job Assistance and Unemployment Beneﬁts. Since 2011, the quota rules
are encoded in Act CXCI of 2011 on Allowances for Persons with Disabilities and the Amendment of Certain
Legislation.
The threshold was 30 employees up to 1997, then it was reduced to 20 employees from 1997. In 2012, the threshold
was increased again to 25 employees. Number of employees is considered as yearly average headcount.
5A person is qualiﬁed with changed working capacity if her overall health status does not exceed 60 percent,
that is, the overall health impairment at least 40 percent, or her working capacity is reduced at least by 50 percent.
The status also implies eligibility to oﬃcial rehabilitation and disability beneﬁts.
6Note the discrepancy in recognition of part-time between total staﬀ and disabled workers: a disabled employee
is counted in the quota only if her contractual working time is minimum 20 hours per week, that is roughly 80
hours per month, compared to the 60 hours/month lower limit in case of average headcount.
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afterwards). Firms have to declare and pay their obligation to the national tax authority on a
quarterly basis.
2.2 Policy changes
There were two major changes in the quota regulation in the last decade.
1. Starting from 2010, the amount of the levy was increased dramatically, by 454 percent,
from HUF 174 thousand per year per missing employee from the quota to 964 thousand
HUF. In 2010 the levy amounted to 86 percent of the total labor cost (gross wage plus
employer's contributions) of a full-time non-disabled minimum wage earner, and 31 percent
of the labor cost of an employee with average wage.
After the 2010 increase Hungary became one of the top OECD countries in terms of the
amount of levy compared to average wages. In 2010, the levy amounted to about 2 percent
of average payroll, in contrast with the typical 0,25-1 percent in OECD countries (OECD
(2003)). What makes the Hungarian system really unique is not the high levy/average
wage but that it is higher than the minimum cost of the quota fulﬁllment. Note that this
increase, which put a signiﬁcant burden on ﬁrms, came into eﬀect in the middle of the
ﬁnancial crisis, after a more than 6 percent GDP loss in 2009.
The ﬁrst announcement about the increase was made in February 2009, and the law was
signed in June of 2009. As a consequence, some ﬁrms already reacted in 2009, therefore
the eﬀects of the policy change are partly reﬂected in the 2009 data.
2. In 2012, the employment threshold was increased from 20 to 25 persons, while the amount
of the levy remained unchanged.7
In this paper, I focus on these two policy changes in order to reveal the eﬀects of the disabled
employment quota in Hungary.
3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the corporate tax data set of Hungarian double-entry book-
keeping ﬁrms. The database contains administrative tax ﬁles data collected by the National
Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) of all double-keeping Hungarian ﬁrms from 2006-2013.
7see Act CXCI of 2011 on allowances for persons with disabilities
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Tax ﬁles comprise detailed balance sheet and income statement data of ﬁrms as well as ﬁrm
characteristics, such as industry, location, number of employees, ownership structure.
The corporate tax database does not contain information on the actual levy payment, as the
rehabilitation contribution is ﬁled in a diﬀerent tax form on a quarterly basis. However, corporate
tax ﬁles also contain number of disabled employees.As both tax statements are gathered and
stored by the NAV, the reliability of the data can be considered high. For ﬁrms, for which
data for number of disabled workers is missing, but there is data on total employment, I replace
missing data to zero disabled employee. The imputation concerns large number of observations.
However, tax database after the imputation and aggregate information about the levy revenues
yields very similar results for the number of missing persons from the quota (for details, see
Appendix B). This implies that the reliability of the data on the number of disabled persons is
very high, and the imputations do not threaten the validity of the results. The correspondence of
levy revenue and disabled employment data also suggests that the enforcement of the regulation
is high; ﬁrms do in fact pay the levy if they do not meet the quota requirements.8
In the corporate tax database, the number of total employees of the ﬁrm is expressed with the
yearly average statistical headcount, however, average yearly headcount of employees is rounded
to an integer number due to the general rules of rounding. In contrast, the quota requirement
is computed using average yearly headcount that is rounded to one decimal digit, and the quota
itself is expressed as a number with one decimal digit (see Section 2). Due to discrepancy in
rounding rules, the calculated quota requirement based on NAV database data might diﬀer from
the actual quota requirement that is prescribed by the law. Implications of diﬀerences in rounding
rules to the estimation are discussed in Section 4).
Basic descriptive statistics from the corporate tax database are summarized in Appendix
F, Table 17. The total number of disabled employees at ﬁrms does not exhibit much increase
in 2010, after the signiﬁcant increase in the levy. However, it seems that majority of disabled
employees is employed in sheltered employment, at special accredited ﬁrms. Firms where the
share of disabled employees reaches 40 percent of total work force, have the possibility to apply
for a special status that implies wage and other subsidies. This status can be achieved through a
process of accreditation, in which the ﬁrms have to meet some criteria to prove that they are able
to rehabilitate disabled employees. As the analysis focuses on the open labor market, I excluded
8However, consistency of disabled employment and levy revenue data does not exclude the possibility that
ﬁrms try to escape paying the levy by falsely reporting disabled employment. However, high cost of being found
in fault in case of labor inspections is a serious disincentive, and internationally high levy revenues also suggest
compliance,therefore I disregard this possibility in the estimation.
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ﬁrms from the estimations where the share of disabled employees exceeded 40 percent.
In 2010, the levy amounted to 86% of total labor cost of a full-time minimum wage earner,
170% of a half time minimum wage earner, and 31% of a full-time average wage earner. As
the quota can be fulﬁlled also with a part-time (minimum half-time) worker, hiring a disabled
minimum wage earner even with zero productivity would incur lower cost by 70 % than paying
the levy, if we disregard adjustment costs of employment and assume that and ﬁrms are able
to hire disabled employees on this wage level. Despite the strong ﬁnancial incentive, majority
of ﬁrms chose not to employ disabled workers but pay the non-compliance levy instead. The
quota fulﬁllment, that is the ratio of the quota that is ﬁlled with disabled employees is less than
30 % even after the levy hike (see Table 17).9 The quota fulﬁllment can be assessed as low in
international comparison, as usually 50-90% of the quota is ﬁlled with disabled employees.10
The low quota fulﬁllment is also reﬂected in the high aggregate levy revenue which increased
from 0,06 percent of GDP in 2009 to 0,24 percent of GDP in 2011, around 65 billion HUF. As
a comparison: total revenue from corporate tax was approximately 2 percent of GDP in 2011,
thus the revenue from non-compliance levy can be considered as substantial. One of the main
questions of the following analysis is whether the low performance is due to the fact that ﬁrms
are not sensitive to the strong ﬁnancial incentive,or other factors impede disabled employment.
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Firms' options
Firms that are subject the regulation and do not employ enough disabled workers to ﬁll the
quota face the following choices:
• Hire additional disabled worker(s)
• Substitute non-disabled employees with a disabled worker
9The quota fulﬁllent can be measured in diﬀerent ways, depending on the assessment of overﬁlling the quota.
The lowest estimation for quota fulﬁllment is given by comparing empty positions to the quota: (1-missing
employees from the/quota)as this method disregards number of disabled employees who are employed above the
quota requirement (11. and 15. row in table 17. Relating the number of employees in non-special ﬁrms to the
quota yields a somewhat higher quota fulﬁllment, as disabled employees in ﬁrms that employ more disabled that
required by the quota also are taken into consideration in this case (12-16. rows in the table).
10In OECD (2003), the quota fulﬁllment was estimated to 64% in Austria, at least 50%in Italy, 46-72% in
Korea, 57% in Germany, 64% in France. Close to 90% of the quota is fulﬁlled in Japan Mori and Sakamoto
(2017). The most similar case to Hungary is Poland, where quota fulﬁllment was similarly low at around 30%
and the levy was relatively high above 2% of average payroll. citeoecd2006)
9
• Pay the levy
• Avoid regulation by reducing or keeping employment below the threshold.
A ﬁrm might indeed reduce its labor demand and run with less employees to avoid the
regulation, but this category also includes ﬁrms that manipulate their oﬃcial size while the true
employment remains the same. This can happen for example by contracting out employees,
employing unreported workers or increasing the working time, that is decrease employment on
the extensive margin while increase it in the intensive margin.
Firms above the threshold
already meets quota
no change
quota not fulﬁlled
pay levy hire disabled
new worker substitute with non-disabled
avoid regulation by getting below threshold
Firms' choice ﬁrst of all depends on the amount of the levy compared to labor costs of disabled
and nondisabled employees, the substitutability between disabled and non-disabled employees
and the marginal revenue product of disabled and nondisabled. A ﬁrm of which optimal size
without the quota is above the threshold, will choose its size below the threshold if the loss from
employing less than optimal employees is lower than both the cost of hiring a disabled (either as
a new hire or subsitution) and the levy. Clearly, this choice is relevant only for ﬁrms for which
the non-quota optimum is not far above the threshold. A ﬁrm will choose paying the levy instead
of employing a disabled, if the proﬁt loss of employing a disabled worker (either with or without
substitution) is higher than the levy. The lower is the levy compared to nondisabled wages, the
labor costs of hiring disabled compared to labor costs of nondisabled, and the lower is the relative
(percieved) productivity of disabled compared to nondisabled employees, the more probable is
that a ﬁrm will choose paying the levy. Regarding the labor costs of disabled employees, both
wages and non-wage costs might diﬀer from those of nondisabled employees.
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Following from the potential responses of ﬁrms, I analyze the eﬀect of the quota - levy system
on the employment of disabled persons, and as the quota-levy poses non-negligible burden on
ﬁrms, I also analyze the eﬀect on ﬁrm behavior. I also aim to reveal the factors inﬂuencing the
eﬀectiveness of the eﬀectiveness of the policy by analyzing the contradiction between low quota
fulﬁllment and high levy.
4.2 Disabled employment eﬀect with sharp discontinuity design
As a starting point, I estimate the eﬀect of the quota-levy system on disabled employment using
sharp regression discontinuity design framework (RDD). The RDD is estimated separately for
every single year from 2007 to 2012. These regressions show how the eﬀect of the policy changes
year to year around the threshold.
Firms with at least 40 % of share of disabled employee ratio are presumably special accredited
ﬁrms (for the details see Section 3), hence these ﬁrms are excluded from econometric analysis.
In the sharp regression discontinuity design, the observed outcome is:
Yit =

Yit(1), if empit >= ct
Yit(0), if empit < ct
Yit(1) = outcome for a randomly chosen population unit if treatment is imposed exogenously
Yit(0) = outcome for a randomly chosen population unit if excluded from treatment exogenously.
Where emp is the variable that divides the population into treated and control groups (run-
ning variable), in our case the number of employees at the ﬁrm), and c is a cutoﬀ value of empit,
so ﬁrms with number of employees above the cutoﬀ belong to the treated group. For assessing
the eﬀect of the regulation on disabled employment, the outcome variable Y is the number of
disabled employees (disemp), but I also look for discontinuities in variables of ﬁrm performance,
such a wages, productivity, proﬁtability at the quota threshold.
We are looking for the treatment eﬀect at the threshold, that is:
τ = E(Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Xi = c)
11
τ = µ+ − µ−
where
µ+ = limx↓c, µ− = limx↑c, µ(x) = E(Yi|Xi = c)
A crucial identifying assumption of the RDD is the exogeneity of selection into the treatment
group. However, ﬁrms with employees close to the threshold employment level have an incentive
to stay or get below the threshold, that is to keep their employment under 20 and under 25
employees after 2012 and avoid the regulation completely. Thus the ﬁrm size is endogenous, as
ﬁrms close to the cutoﬀ might self-select themselves between the treatment and control groups.
Non-random ﬁrm selection might distort the estimated treatment eﬀect. In the following, I am
going to present the results from the baseline (naive) speciﬁcation, then I am going to adjust the
results to account for the potential bias arising from the ﬁrm size manipulation.
Figure 1 and 2 show average number of disabled employees in ﬁrms by number of employees
in diﬀerent years and the ﬁtted 4th order polynomial on both sides of the cutoﬀ using the optimal
plotting method of Calonico et al. (2015). Figure 1 suggest that the most striking increase in
disabled employment is not between ﬁrms with 19 and 20 employees, but between ﬁrms with 20
and 21 employees in 2010. Similarly, in 2012, when the threshold was increased to 25 employees,
sharp increase can be detected also between ﬁrms with 25 and 26 employees in addition to
discontinuity between 24 and 25 employees.
Diﬀerences in rounding rules between employment data in the database and in computation
of mandatory quota might explain this "double" discontinuity. Namely, the average headcount
is rounded to an integer number in the NAV database, while the quota regulation is based on the
average headcount that is rounded to one decimal digit (for details, see Section 2). Consequently,
the category of ﬁrms with exactly 20 employees in the database is a mixture of treated and non-
treated ﬁrms.11 Therefore I omitted ﬁrms with exactly 20 employees from the RDD regressions
as those ﬁrms might be both above and below the legal threshold.
The treatment eﬀect is identiﬁed nonparametrically by using the method of Calonico et al.
11This group contains ﬁrms with average size between 19.5 and 20.4 employees. These ﬁrms show up with 20
employees in the database as their size is rounded to an integer number. However, ﬁrms with average number of
employees between 19.5 and 19.9 are not subject of the quota regulation, as rounded to one decimal digit, their
headcount is below 20 employees, that is these ﬁrms are below the legal threshold. However, ﬁrms between 20.0
and 20.4 employees are already required to meet the quota or pay the levy.
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Figure 1: Average number of disabled employees by ﬁrm size, 2008-2010
Figure 2: Average number of disabled employees by ﬁrm size, 2011-2012
(2014) that applies kernel-based local polynomials on both sides of the threshold. Speciﬁcally,
τˆp = µˆp,+(hn)− ˆµp,−(hn)
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Table 1: Rdrobust results, c=20
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
τ robust 0.086 0.079 0.017 0.099 0.285 0.244 0.063
robust SE 0.034 0.042 0.041 0.04 0.046 0.043 0.035
adj SE robust 0.044 0.052 0.061 0.05 0.056 0.053 0.055
τ conventional 0.084 0.068 0.028 0.106 0.288 0.245 0.068
conventional SE 0.03 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.039 0.037 0.031
adj conv SE 0.039 0.047 0.055 0.045 0.05 0.042 0.044
bandwidth 6.55 3.365 5.135 6.144 7.086 6.788 5.668
eﬀ. # of obs(l) 7563 3004 5294 6672 8819 8188 5663
eﬀ. # of obs(r) 3137 1711 2545 2766 2815 2733 2572
order of p 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Where µˆp,+(hn) = e
′
0βˆp,+(hn) and µˆp,−(hn) = e
′
0βˆp,−(hn).
with:
βˆp,+(hn) = argmin
n∑
i=1
1(empi >= c)(Yi − rp(empi − c)′β)2Khn((empi − c)
and
βˆp,−(hn) = argmin
n∑
i=1
1(empi < c)(Yi − rp(empi − c)′β)2Khn((empi − c)
Where rp = (1, x, ...xp), e0 = (1, 0, ..0) ∈ R, K() is a kernel function, hn is the bandwidth.
The advantage of this method compared to the OLS is its ﬂexibility: it allows for non-
linear relationship between the running and the dependent variables and the bandwidth is also
estimated by minimizing mean squared error instead of an arbitrary choice.(The speciﬁcation
and the results of the OLS model can be found in the Appendix C.)
As the method of computing optimal bandwidth (see Calonico et al. (2014) does not work be-
cause of discrete running variable, I make the running variable continuous by adding a uniformly
distributed random number u ∼ [−0.5, 0.5] to the number of employees emp and estimated the
RDD with this created running variable. I simulate the running variable 100 times and present
the τ as an average of the 100 estimations. In the table I present the average of standard errors
and adjusted standard errors, which were computed by adding the standard deviation of the
simulation to the average standard error of the simulations.
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Table 2: Rdrobust results, c=25
2010 2011 2012
τ robust -0.145 0.034 0.289
robust SE 0.092 0.088 0.057
adj SE robust 0.122 0.118 0.067
τ conventional -0.115 0.063 0.284
conventional SE 0.083 0.078 0.049
adj conv SE 0.112 0.104 0.06
bandwidth 4.792 5.203 8.163
eﬀ. # of obs(l) 2000 2344 5461
eﬀ. # of obs(r) 1501 1570 2269
order of p 1 1 1
The results (Table 1 and 2) show very strong ﬁrm reaction to changes in the levy and the
quota threshold. There is no signiﬁcant discontinuity in disabled employment in 2008, when
the levy was very low. The treatment eﬀect is already signiﬁcant in 2009, denoting that the
expected number of employed disabled is higher above the quota threshold as ﬁrms have already
started adjustment in 2009. The estimated treatment parameter is much higher in 2010, after
the dramatic hike in the non-compliance levy that came into eﬀect in 2010. Strikingly, in 2012,
when the threshold was increased to 25 from 20 employees, the discontinuity at the old threshold
disappears, but a new discontinuity of similar magnitude emerges above the new threshold, 25
employees, that was missing in 2011.
The parameter can be interpreted as ﬁrms just above the threshold employ 0.244-0.285 ad-
ditional disabled worker on account of the quota-levy regulation in 2010 -2011, that is roughly
24.4-28.9 percent of the quota is fulﬁlled because of the levy. Important to note that this number
can be regarded large compared to the few estimations in the literature, for example Lalive et
al. (2013) estimate that 4 percent of the quota is fulﬁlled thanks to the regulation.
4.3 Endogeneity of ﬁrm size
Given the ﬁrms' incentive to avoid the quota-levy by keeping their size below the threshold,
assumption of random ﬁrm selection between treatment and control groups might be violated.
Malo and Pagán (2014) and Mori and Sakamoto (2017) do not ﬁnd evidence for signiﬁcant
ﬁrm size manipulation around the disability quota threshold in Spain and Japan. However, as
Garicano et al. (2016) shows, size-related regulations might have strong distorting eﬀect around
the threshold, if the regulation poses substantial costs to ﬁrms. In France, labor costs increase
considerably above 50 employees due to various administrative requirements. This huge jump in
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marginal labor costs prevent many ﬁrms from growing, resulting in a bunching in the distribution
of ﬁrms below the threshold.
In Hungarian data, distribution of ﬁrms around the threshold shows the eﬀort of ﬁrms to
keep their size below 20 employees in 2010, that is reﬂected in a noteworthy, though not a huge
bunching (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Distribution of ﬁrms by number of employees, 2008-2010
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However, as the new threshold increases from 20 to 25 persons in 2012, a new bunching emerges
at the old threshold, while the old bunching below 20 employees disappears (Figure 4).
To study more closely the eﬀect of the policy change on ﬁrm behavior, I also look at the
distribution of ﬁrms around the threshold, with 15-25 employees before the levy hike. First, I
compare the distribution of these ﬁrms with the ﬁrm distribution around a placebo threshold,
35 employees.
Figure 5 and 6 show that the distribution around the real threshold is more skewed, and the
probability that the number of employees of a given ﬁrm is below the threshold is much higher
than in case of the placebo threshold.
A similar conclusion arises from comparison of ﬁrms near the threshold with no disabled em-
ployees before the policy change with ﬁrms that already had employed disabled ex-ante, thus
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Figure 4: Distribution of ﬁrms by number of employees, 2011-2013
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already fulﬁlled the quota. The ﬁrms in the latter group do not have to pay the levy, thus prac-
tically not aﬀected by levy increase. The probability that the number of employees is below the
threshold after the levy increase is much higher in case of aﬀected than in case of non-aﬀected
ﬁrms. However, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence can be observed between distribution of ﬁrms with and
without disabled employees at the placebo threshold (35 employees). Table 3 summarizes the
relevant probabilities.
Table 3: Distribution of ﬁrms in 2010
Prob(emp2010 < c|emp2008 ∈ [c− h, c+ h]) (1)
Nonrandom ﬁrm selection was investigated formally using a nonparametric manipulation
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Figure 5: Distribution of ﬁrms in 2010 around the real threshold (20 employees), with 15-24
employees in 2008
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Figure 6: Distribution of ﬁrms in 2010 around a placebo threshold (35 employees), with 30-39
employees in 2008
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test of Cattaneo et al. (2018). The test is based on the consideraton that manipulation of the
the running variable might be captured by a discontinuity in the distribution of the running
variable around the cutoﬀ. The test uses local polynomial distribution estimators and based on
a Wald-type statistic where the null hypothesis is the continuity of the running variable at the
cutoﬀ:
Ho:limemp↓c f(emp) = limemp↑cf(emp), vs H1: limemp↓c f(emp) 6= limemp↑cf(emp)
The test statistic is the following:
Tp(h) =
fˆ+,p(h)− fˆ−,p(h)
Vˆp(h)
Where:
V 2p (h) = V [fˆ+,p(h)− fˆ−,p(h)];
The test rejects H0 at α level iﬀ T 2p > χ
2
α−1
The authors emphasize that the test can be also used for discrete running variables. The
results of the density test are summarized in Table 4. 12 The density test suggests manipulation
of the running variable at c = 20 in 2010 and 2011 after increasing the threshold. However, in
2012, the test statistics looses signiﬁcance at c = 20 and becomes signiﬁcant at 5 % signiﬁcance
level at c = 25 in line with the increase of the threshold. As a robustness check, the test is
implemented for placebo thresholds for 2010 and the test shows size manipulation only at the
quota threshold, c = 20.
Table 4: Results of manipulation test rddensity for diﬀerent years and placebo cutoﬀs
c=20 c=25 2010
T P>|T | T P>|T| c T P>|T|
2007 -2.447 .014 2007 -.032 .974 15 1.373 .17
2008 -1.837 .066 2008 .447 .655 20 -4.989*** 0.00
2009 -1.969 .049 2009 -.628 .53 25 -.693 .488
2010 -4.989*** 0.00 2010 -.693 .488 30 -.465 .642
2011 -3.69*** 0.00 2011 -.101 .919
2012 -1.726 .084 2012 -2.301** .021
Restriction: equal c.d.f. and higher order derivatives assumed on the two sides of the cutoﬀ.
Bandwidth selection is based on MSE of diﬀerence and sum of densities,assuming
one common bandwidth.Optimal bandwidth is selected as the lower of the two above criteria
12I also run the test with predeﬁned bandwidth h = 5, with no restrictions imposed on the shape of the c.d.f
and it yielded similar results.
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Figure 7 shows the estimated density function on the two sides of the cutoﬀ. In 2010,
discontinuity is observed at c = 20, while in 2013, at c = 25
Figure 7: Estimated ﬁrm density by rddensity and discontinuity at the threshold,2010
4.4 Discontinuity in ﬁrm characteristics
The sectoral and regional composition of the the ﬁrms below and above the cutoﬀ is very similar
on the two sides of the threshold (see Appendix E). I check the total eﬀect of all potential
covariates on ﬁrm size manipulation with the composite covariate index (see Card et al. (2007)).
The number of disabled employees in 2010 are regressed on a set of covariates and the predicted
value from this regression is plotted against the ﬁrm size (Figure 8). The following covariates are
added as right hand side variables: ﬁrm age, dummy for state and foreign ownership, sectoral and
regional dummies, lagged values of productivity, average wages, proﬁt ratio, change in the total
employment in the two years before the levy increase (2007-2009). The lack of discontinuity in the
predicted value around the threshold shows the lack of relationship between ﬁrm characteristics
and ﬁrm size manipulation. For the variables of ﬁrm's performance (productivity, average wages,
proﬁt ratio, change in the total employment) lagged values show up in the composite covariate
index, as the contemporaneous values already include eﬀects of the regulation, and the aim of
20
the exercise is to ﬁnd factors determining ﬁrm's choice to keep their size below the threshold.The
results suggest that bunching is not systematic, ﬁrms' selection into the treatment group is based
on unobserved ﬁrm characteristics.
Figure 8: Composite covariate index, 2010
I also investigate discontinuity in the contemporenous values of ﬁrm performance. As Gar-
icano et al. (2016) shows, if many ﬁrms choose to avoid the size related regulation by keeping its
size below the threshold, we can expect a spike in the productivity distribution of ﬁrms at the
threshold, and he ﬁnds empirical support for these predictions in the case of French ﬁrms. I test
congestion in productivity and other ﬁrm speciﬁc variables by running an RD on these variables.
I test the following outcome variables. profitratio: proﬁt ratio (pretax proﬁt/number of em-
ployees), lnaverwage: logarithm of total wage bill/number of employees, lnprod: logarithm of
sales/number of employees lnprod_gdp: logarithm of labor productivity (value added/number of
employees) lnsales: logarithm of sales lnprod: logarithm of sales/number of employees firmage:
ﬁrm age (in years), foreign: dummy variable for foreign owned ﬁrms (if share of foreign own-
ership is greater than 50%.), state: dummy variable for foreign owned ﬁrms (if share of state
ownership is greater than 50%).
I look for discontinuity in the deviations of the above variables from the industry average.
The results for 2010 are summarized in Table 5. While disabled employment eﬀect is signiﬁc-
ant in magnitude after the levy hike, the RD regressions show no discontinuity in the variables
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that capture ﬁrm characteristics.13.
Results conﬁrm that while a non-negligible fraction of ﬁrms chooses to avoid the regulation,
this decision is not reﬂected in diﬀerence in ﬁrm characteristics and performance just below and
above the threshold neither before nor after the policy change.
Table 5: Rdrobust results on ﬁrm characteristics (2010, c=20)
proﬁtratio lnaverwage lnprod lnprod_gdp lnsales ﬁrmage foreign state
τ robust 0.012 0.011 0.051 0.025 0.092 0.806 0.016 0.004
robust SE 0.011 0.046 0.084 0.069 0.092 0.753 0.021 0.009
adj SE robust 0.011 0.056 0.114 0.089 0.122 1.157 0.021 0.009
τ conventional 0.01 0.018 0.052 0.032 0.08 0.62 0.018 0.004
conventional SE 0.009 0.039 0.07 0.058 0.077 0.647 0.018 0.008
adj conv SE 0.012 0.049 0.092 0.07 0.099 1.028 0.021 0.01
bandwidth 4.847 5.349 6.155 6.175 5.534 4.149 6.927 6.243
eﬀ. # of obs(l) 5223 5903 7063 6749 6113 4257 8482 7342
eﬀ. # of obs(r) 1931 2159 2436 2320 2206 1631 2763 2509
order of p 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4.5 Bunching and estimation of the treatment eﬀect
The number of employees is not exogenous as it might be a choice of an optimizing ﬁrm that can
react to the regulation, and the bunching below the threshold suggests that the assumption of
random ﬁrm selection between treatment and control groups is indeed violated. Therefore, even
if ﬁrm choice is based on unobserved characteristics, using the ﬁrm size as a running variable
might produce a biased estimation of the treatment eﬀect. The direction of the bias is not
straightforward a priori. In our case we can assume that "bunchers" have on average lower
propensity to employ disabled than ﬁrms that do not manipulate their size, so the baseline RD
estimations might produce an upward biased treatment eﬀect.
The bias from manipulation is sometimes treated with the so-called doughnut-hole method,
that is by dropping observations in the close neighborhood to the cutoﬀ. However, by ignoring
data close to the cutoﬀ we lose important information. Another approach is implemented by
Lalive et al. (2013) who calculate the bias arising from bunching with a back-of-the-envelope
calculation. The basic idea is a thought experiment: what would be the diﬀerence in mean of
disabled employees just above and just below the threshold if there were no bunching, that is
ﬁrms simply would not have the possibility to avoid the regulation with size manipulation. Lalive
et al. (2013) move calculated number of bunchers from just below to just above the threshold,
13No discontinuity can be detected for 2011, for pooled estimation for 2010-2011 with a time dummy for 2011
and 2012 with c=25
22
and recalculate the raw unconditional mean of disabled employees assuming that they continue
to employ disabled .14 Gerard et al. (2016) estimate lower and upper bounds by truncating the
distribution of the outcome variable above the cutoﬀ, where some units assumed to manipulate
the running variable. In both applications, the share of manipulators is calculated using a non-
parametric density test. I provide a lower bound to the treatment by reestimating the RD on a
simulated sample with a novel method, that is related to the main idea of the Lalive et al. (2013)
method.
The estimation consists of the following steps:
1. Construction a counterfactual distribution by ﬁtting a power law on ﬁrm distribution by
size, omitting observations with number of employees c+ /− 5.
2. Calculating number of ﬁrms that are below the threshold to avoid the regulation ("bunch-
ers") and missing ﬁrms from above the threshold by comparing actual and the counterfac-
tual distribution in the c+/−5 range. (A similar method is used for example in Harasztosi
and Lindner (2015)).
3. Constructing a simulated sample such that the resulting ﬁrm distribution is smooth by
moving calculated number of randomly selected ﬁrms above the threshold into the c + 5
range, while leaving the number of disabled employees unchanged.
4. Re-estimating RD on the simulated sample and repeat this exercise many times.
The lower bound is the average of treatment eﬀects of re-estimated RD from a simulation of
100 draws.
This method is similar in its approach to the method of Lalive et al. (2013). However, I use
observations not only just above and just below the cutoﬀ, but in a wider range, and give an RD
estimation of the treatment eﬀect on the simulated sample.
Graph 9 shows the estimated counterfactual distribution and the ﬁrm distribution of the
simulated sample after moving randomly selected ﬁrms from below to above the cutoﬀ in 2010.
Results of RD estimation with the simulated sample are summarized in Table 6. The results
show that the lower bound treatment eﬀect is lower than the simple RD estimation by more than
14Lalive et al. (2013) calculate also an upper bound in addition to the lower bound. However, in contrast to the
Hungarian case, the quota threshold concerns the number of nondisabled employees in Austria. Consequently,
there are ﬁrms which choose nondisabled employment below the threshold, but employ a disabled worker if this
worker increases the proﬁt. As the running variable in Lalive et al. (2013) is the number of nondisabled employees,
this group of ﬁrms create a downward bias in the treatment eﬀect estimated with baseline RD. In Hungary, the
threshold refers the size of the total workforce, hence this downward bias is not relevant.
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Figure 9: Counterfactual distribution (ﬁt-
ted power law)
Figure 10: Firm size distribution in the sim-
ulated sample distribution
Table 6: Rdrobust results for lower bound
2008(c=20) 2010 (c=20) 2012 (c=25)
τ robust naive 0.017 0.285*** 0.289***
τ robust simulated 0.008 0.163*** 0.259***
SE robust simulated (0.063) (0.051) (0.077)
40%, but it remains signiﬁcantly high. However, in 2012, where the size of the bunching is much
smaller, the lower bound is much closer to the simple RD disabled employment eﬀect.
The reaction of ﬁrms is strong even if the magnitude of the levy compared to the wages is taken
into account. The elasticity of substitution between disabled workers and non-disable workers,
that is the percentage change in relative employment of disabled to non-disabled divided by
percentage change of relative disabled/nondisabled relative labor cost, is the highest in Hungary
among comparable estimations, even if the bias arising from the bunching is taken into account
(see Table 7)15 However,the baseline (below threshold) ratio of disabled is the lowest in Hungary.
Table 7: Comparison of disabled employment eﬀect estimations across countries
coeﬀ. threshold quota change in dis dis.emp. quota fulf. %change in levy/average % change in elast. of
/nondis. emp. below thr. below threshold dis/non emp labor cost dis/nondis rel. wage substitution
Japan* 1.42 300 2% 0.5% 1.6% 87% 30% 11% -10.2% -2.97
Austria** 0.04 25 5% 0.2% 1.3% 25% 12% 6% -5.9% -2.01
Hun,baseline,2010***, 0.29 20 5% 1.5% 0.6% 11% 264% 31% -23.8% -11.06
Hun, lower bound,2010 0.18 20 5% 0.9% 0.6% 11% 164% 31% -23.8% -6.86
Hun(by 2008 to 2010) 0.27 20 5% 1.3% 0.7% 13% 206% 31% -19.4% -10.64
*based on Mori and Sakamoto (2017) and own calculation.The source of average non-disabled wage is DIDA.
**based on Lalive et al. (2013) and own calculation.
The elasticity of substitution diﬀers from that of Lalive et al. (2013), as I added obligatory employer social contributions to the nominal wage.
The Source of the employer contributions data is the OECD Taxing Wages database.
***Average labor cost is calculated as average gross earnings plus employer contributions.
15Note that the elasticity of substitution can also be calculated by comparing the above-threshold employment
before and after the levy increase. This is shown in the last row in Table 7. This calculation yields similar
elasticity of substitution than the baseline RD estimations for 2010.
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5 Firm heterogeneity in disabled employment eﬀect
The above section concluded that ﬁrms' decision to stay below the threshold is not systematic:
while the bunching clearly shows that a fraction of ﬁrms chooses keeping its size below the
threshold, selection of ﬁrms between the treatment and control groups is based on unobservable
ﬁrm characteristics. However, the disabled employment eﬀect of the quota-levy regulation in the
neighborhood to the threshold is inﬂuenced by observable ﬁrm characteristics. As ﬁrm selection
between control and treatment groups does not depend on ﬁrm characteristics, the comparison
of the treatment eﬀect in RD regressions estimated on diﬀerent subgroups captures well the
heterogeneity in ﬁrms' reaction to the quota.
5.1 Eﬀect of ﬁrm size
Note that the total quota fulﬁllment that considers all non-special ﬁrms above the threshold
exhibit a much less favorable picture than the estimated treatment eﬀect around the threshold
plus the quota fulﬁllment below the threshold. However, this discrepancy arises from the fact
that the ratio of disabled employees at the ﬁrm decreases with ﬁrm size (see Table 8).
Table 8: Ratio of disabled employees and average wages by ﬁrm size
disabled ratio% wage cost (million HUF)
ﬁrm size N mean sd mean sd
0-19 249981 0.09% 1.38% 1186 1620
20-25 2983 1.82% 3.59% 1833 1657
26-49 5383 2.05% 3.54% 1979 1765
50-99 2857 1.93% 3.23% 2256 1903
100-499 2090 1.66% 2.92% 2591 1828
500-999 222 0.92% 1.77% 2963 1616
1000- 160 0.83% 1.42% 3076 1709
It is in part attributable to the much higher average wage level of larger ﬁrms, however,
ﬁrm size remains signiﬁcant in explaining the ratio of disabled employees at the ﬁrm even after
controlling for the wage level (see Table 9). However, one might expect opposite eﬀect of ﬁrm
size. One-oﬀ costs of hiring disabled (for example accommodation of the workplace) per disabled
worker are lower for larger ﬁrms with more disabled employees and the probability that a disabled
employee can fulﬁll a given job might be higher a larger ﬁrm with larger variety of jobs. The fact
that quota fulﬁllment is worse for larger ﬁrms indicates that there are other signiﬁcant barriers
to employing disabled.
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Table 9: Regression for ratio of disabled employment above the threshold, 2010-2013
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES disemp_percent disemp_percent disemp_percent
lnemp -0.248*** -0.134*** -0.137***
(0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0208)
lnaverwage -0.815*** -0.650***
(0.0322) (0.0392)
lnprod -0.157***
(0.0233)
d2011 0.097*** 0.127*** 0.132***
(0.0278) (0.0282) (0.0289)
d2012 0.000504 0.122*** 0.110***
(0.0311) (0.0318) (0.0326)
d2013 -0.102*** 0.0398 0.0261
(0.0334) (0.0340) (0.0348)
Constant 2.919*** 8.541*** 8.826***
(0.0916) (0.245) (0.259)
Observations 46,372 46,276 44,952
R-squared 0.006 0.033 0.034
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.2 Role of disabled labor supply and adjustment costs
The fact that majority of ﬁrms choose paying the levy instead of hiring disabled workers might
be explained by the following reasons:
• High (perceived) adjustment (hiring and ﬁring) costs
• Labor supply shortage of disabled
One can argue that both hiring and ﬁring costs might be higher in case of non-disabled
workers. Accommodation of the workplace to be able to receive disabled workers might be
costly. Searching costs are probably also much higher in case of disabled workers (see e.g. Silva
and Vall-Castelló (2017)).16
However, labor supply shortage is probably a major obstacle to substantial rise in disabled
employment. According to the labor force survey, the share of disabled population is roughly
in line with European average, but the activity rate of disabled is quite low, only around 25%.
16There are basically two organizations that mediate demand and supply of disabled. The local agencies of
National Oﬃce of Rehabilitation and Social Aﬀairs, and the alternative suppliers. Additionally, public employment
services (PES) also had matching role. However, operation of these agencies can be characterized by uneven
territorial distribution and scarcity.
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There were 48 thousand disabled unemployed in 2011, and additional 30-40 thousand can be
assessed as discouraged workers.17 Meanwhile, in 2010 the levy was paid after 57 thousand, in
2011 63.5 thousand employees from the quota.18 Assuming that the probability of matching is
much lower in case of disabled, the magnitude of these numbers suggest that perhaps there are
simply not enough disabled jobseekers who would accept a job at the oﬀered wage in the given
regions, industries, jobs.
The low eﬀective labor supply might be related to the institutional environment of other
disability policies. Around 2010, most disabled workers were employed in sheltered workplaces -
at accredited special institutions and ﬁrms - and the empirical evidence suggests that sheltered
employment does not facilitate integration into the open labor market. However, availability
of personalized rehabilitation services and supported work, that is, comprehensive support for
working in the open labor market that proved to be much more eﬀective, is quite limited ( Scharle
and Váradi (2015), Scharle and Csillag (2016) Adamecz-Völgyi and Scharle (2017)).
Lack of support in getting to the workplace also might impede jobseeking of disabled. Oppor-
tunity costs of working might also constrain labor supply. Up to 2014, earning activity terminated
eligibility to disability and rehabilitation beneﬁts above a certain, relatively low earning level.19
I use regional variation in disabled employment and population to test the role of disabled
labor supply and high adjustment costs in ﬁrms' reaction. Due to anecdotal evidence, ﬁrms
in Central Hungary and Western Transdanubia face with disabled labor shortage, while less
developed regions - such as South Transdanubia and regions of Great Plain - have excess disabled
supply.20
Table 10 shows that the share of disabled in total working age population is indeed lower in
17source:Central Statistical Oﬃce
18The data from the database are not comparable in one to one with the unemployed data from the labor force
survey.
19The amount of rehabilitation and disability beneﬁts has changed many times since 2010, it was linked to the
previous income and depended on degree of health impairment. In case of the disability pension (for disabled
with high capacity loss and no expected gain from rehabilitation) the eligibility terminated after 6 month of work,
if the wage exceeded 70% of previous net wage or the minimum wage. The temporary rehabilitation allowance
(for disabled whose working capacity can be restored or improved by rehabilitation, with capacity loss 50-79%)
was linked to the previous wage and was relatively generous (50-61% of previous wage, but in average close to
the minimum wage), and the eligibility has terminated after 3 month if the wage exceeded 90% of previous wage.
Disabled with low, 40-50% capacity loss are entitled to the regular social allowance, what was ﬂat and amounted
about one third of the minimum wage. In case of the regular social allowance, the eligibility terminated after
6 month if the wage exceeded 80 % of the minimum wage. Between 2014 and 2016, eligibility to rehabilitation
beneﬁt is terminated above 20 working hours per week, regardless the earned amount. Since 2016, eligibility is
linked to the earnings again in case of both rehabilitation and disabled beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, eligibility terminates
if earnings exceed 150% of the minimum wage for 3 consecutive month.
20for example see the analysis of a HR company, Trenkwalder. https://www.hrportal.hu/hr/megvaltozott-
munkakepesseguek-foglalkoztatasa-ketteszakadt-az-orszag-20160203.html
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the central and western regions21.
Table 10: Share of disabled population in regions
region code Hungarian name English name % of disabled
in the working age pop.
1 Közép-Magyarország Central Hungary 7.3
2 Közép-Dunántúl Central Transdanubia 9.2
3 Nyugat-Dunántúl Western Transdanubia 9.2
4 Dél-Dunántúl South Transdanubia 16.8
5 Észak-Magyarország North Hungary 14.1
6 Észak-Alföld North Great Plain 14.7
7 Dél-Alföld South Great Plain 14.8
Source:Labor force survey 2011, Central Statistical Oﬃce
However, Hungarian regions diﬀer in many other important aspects, for example average
productivity and general wage level. Underdeveloped Eastern regions can be characterized with
generally lower wage and less productive ﬁrms, and presumably ratio of wages to the levy might
also inﬂuence the reaction of ﬁrms.
Against this background, I estimate the treatment eﬀect within four subgroups. I divided
the regions into two groups, the low supply regions (Central Hungary, Central Transdanubia
and western Transdanubia) and high supply regions (South Transdanubia, North Great Plain,
South Great Plain and North Hungary). Within each of the two groups, ﬁrms are divided into
a low wage (below average wage of ﬁrms between 15-25 employees in 2010-2011) and a high
wage group (above average wage). Figure 11 indicates that both ﬁrm wage level and ratio of the
disabled inﬂuences reaction of ﬁrms. Firms in low supply regions employ less disabled in average
even under the threshold and react less to the quota regulation. Wage level of ﬁrms also aﬀects
the reaction of ﬁrm. Results suggest that ﬁrms with lower average wage are more inclined to
react to the quota in both low supply and high supply regions. Stronger reaction of low-wage
ﬁrms was also found at Lalive et al. (2013) for Austrian ﬁrms. Given that the levy is ﬂat, the
levy compared to the average wage level is lower for ﬁrms with higher average wages, hence the
levy poses lower burden relative to other costs. Note that the wage does not inﬂuence disabled
employment below the threshold, where the levy is negligible, indicating that wage level matters
as it determines the relative burden the levy poses on the ﬁrm. Heterogeneity in the treatment
eﬀect is also reﬂected in RD estimates implemented on the four diﬀerent subgroups by wage level
and regional supply of disabled (Table 11).
212011 LFS data are based on a survey, so number of disabled does not coincide with the number of people
with oﬃcial status of changed working capacity, but can be used as an indicator.
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Table 11: RD robust estimation for diﬀerent subgroups, 2010-2011
supply low low high high
wage low high low high
mean_tau_robust .151 .101 .628 .314
mean_se_robust .136 .029 .284 .073
adjusted_se_robust* .156 .029 .304 .073
mean_tau_conventional .248 .135 .469 .388
mean_se_conventional .086 .021 .143 .047
adjusted_se_conventional* .093 .023 .15 .052
mean_bandwidth 4.268 21.071 6.779 27.965
eﬀ_number_of_obs_l 1566 29213 1420 16150
eﬀ_number_of_obs_r 499 3240 497 2367
order_of_polinomial 1 1 1 1
Figure 11: Average number of disabled employees by ﬁrm size and ﬁrst order polynomial in
subgroups, 2010-2011
Results suggest that ﬁrms face - or perceive - diﬃculties in hiring disabled employees, however,
the eﬀect of disabled ratio on ﬁrms' reaction may capture multiple problems both on the employee
and on the employer side. The supply is constrained by low capacity of rehabilitation services,
disincentive scheme of disabled allowances, lack of support in transportation.
On the demand side, high one-oﬀ costs of hiring (for example high searching, accommodating,
training costs) and discrimination on the employers' side might be the most important barriers
to employing disabled employees. Where the ratio of disabled is lower, the above problems gain
momentum and might hinder disabled employment excessively. My results suggest that eﬃciency
of quota-levy regulation could be improved signiﬁcantly by addressing the above frictions on
29
disabled labor market. The relative importance of the above factors is a subject of further
research.
Table 12: Number of ﬁrm in diﬀerent regions in the NAV database (2010)
Region NUTS2 Freq (thousand) Percent Cum
1. 204 51.3 51.3
2. 34 8.7 60.0
3. 31 8.0 67.9
4. 27 6.9 74.9
5. 28 7.1 81.9
6. 36 9.1 91.0
7. 36 9.1 100
Total 398 100
6 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates intense reaction of Hungarian ﬁrms to the increased levy accompanied
to the disability quota. In 2010, the Hungarian levy was increased drastically, by 454 percent,
reaching an exceptionally high level compared to average wages. This measure posed a signiﬁcant
burden on ﬁrms in the middle of the ﬁnancial crisis. There are a few papers in the literature
that analyze the eﬀect of the disability quota with a moderate levy and usually ﬁnd small or
insigniﬁcant eﬀect. The Hungarian case demonstrates how ﬁrms can cope with the quota if the
accompanied levy is really substantial and creates a strong ﬁnancial incentive. Many ﬁrms near
the threshold clearly make an eﬀort to avoid the regulation by keeping the size of their workforce
below the quota threshold. This attempt results in a remarkable bunching in ﬁrms' distribu-
tion below the threshold employment level. Firm size endogeneity might compromise baseline
regression discontinuity estimations as the random assignment of ﬁrms between treated and con-
trol groups is violated. However, I could not detect any discontinuity in ﬁrm speciﬁc variables
and these variables do not seem to inﬂuence ﬁrms' choice to stay below above the threshold,
suggesting that selection between treatment and control groups is based on unobservable ﬁrm
characteristics. I add a lower band to the disabled employment eﬀect by re-estimating the RD on
a simulated sample. The results suggest that disabled employment eﬀect of the quota-levy sys-
tem is very high in international comparison even after controlling for the potential bias caused
by the bunching.
However, the eﬀectiveness of the policy is questionable. Though the disabled employment
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policy eﬀect and the estimated elasticity of substitution can be considered high, majority of
aﬀected ﬁrms pays the levy instead of hiring a disabled, resulting in a low fulﬁllment of the
quota less than 30 percent. Taking into consideration the exceptionally high level of the levy,
the low fulﬁllment of the quota is somewhat surprising, as ﬁrms would incur lower wage cost if
hired a part-time, low wage disabled employee even with zero productivity than paying the levy.
This contradiction suggests that there are important factors beyond relative productivity that
constrain hiring disabled employees. Speciﬁcally, it seems that the main barrier to employing
disabled persons is the low eﬀective labor supply and/or high (perceived) non-wage costs of
employing disabled. Exploiting regional diﬀerences in the ratio of disabled population, I ﬁnd
evidence that disabled employment eﬀect of the quota regulation varies with the share of disabled
population in the region. This implies that eﬀectiveness of the policy might be hampered by
the the shortage of eﬀective supply of disabled and/or high adjustment costs of hiring disabled
persons. As ﬁrms are not able to fulﬁll the quota, the regulation behaves like a tax that primarily
hits low-wage ﬁrms. My results suggest that eﬃciency of the quota-levy system could be enhanced
signiﬁcantly by addressing the frictions on disabled labor market.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Details of the quota rules
In average headcount, part-time employees and employees that work only in a part of the year
are treated diﬀerently. Part-time employees are considered as a full person (not as a full-time
equivalent), but they are counted only if their working time due to their contract is minimum 15
hours per week (about 60 hours per month).If the person is employed only for a half month, she
will be counted if the number of her actual working hours exceeds 30 hours. However, employees
that are employed only in a part of the year, are counted proportionally with the ratio of their
time of employed status in the year.For example, an employee that was employed for 6 months at
a company, is counted as 0,5 employee in average headcount, regardless that she is a part-time or
full-time worker. A half-time (4 hours a day) employee employed in the whole year is considered
as one person in the average headcount.The average headcount of a ﬁrm that applies 20 full-time
employees and 2 part-time employees throughout the year is 22, while the average headcount of
a ﬁrm with 20 full-time employees and two employees that quit the ﬁrm mid-year is 21.
Other changes in the quota regulation in 2011 and 2012:
• From January 2011, employee leasing companies, that were exempt the regulation until
2010, are also required to pay the rehabilitation contribution. It implies that this policy
change might have also contributed to the increase in aggregate disabled employment in
2011. Beyond its direct eﬀect (45 out of the 519 employee leaser companies were between
15 and 25 employees this the regulation also might have inﬂuenced the behavior of smaller
ﬁrms in general. The exemption until 2011 allowed smaller ﬁrms to exempt the regulation
by working with leased workers instead of employees with employment contract, that count
for the average headcount. However, the regulation probably increased the price of leased
employees and decreased the relative advantage of leasing employees. (About the potential
eﬀect of this policy change, see Data section)
• Since 2012, employers might get allowance from employer social contribution for two years,
if they employ disabled employees.22 The allowance is 27 percent of the gross wage, but
maximum 27 percent of double of the minimum wage. The regulation implies that the
22Persons with changed working capacity are eligible for the rehabilitation card, that qualiﬁes employers to the
allowance in case of employing card owners.
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Table 13: Variable: number of disabled employees at ﬁrms. Original and ﬁlled with imputed
zeros.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
disabled employees original 5404 0.80 2.07 0 29
disabled employees with imputations 21710 0.20 1.09 0 29
relative labor cost of employing disabled employment has decreased further. However, in
2012, only 6400 rehabilitation cards were demanded.
7.2 Appendix B: Data imputations
The ﬁrm tax database contains a variable of number of disabled employees. However for majority
of ﬁrms which have data for number of total employees, this information is missing. Based on
the assumption that ﬁrms who employ disabled and reduce their levy obligation do not leave
this part empty, I replaced missing data with zeros. As the share of imputed data are very high,
the imputation need to be addressed.
I have data on the total levy revenues for every year and for the share of revenues paid by
business organizations (that are in the tax database) for 2015 and 2016. Moreover, for 2015 I
have ﬁrm size breakdown of the revenues paid by ﬁrms. Using the 2015 composition of revenues
for 2013 data, the levy is paid after 47.9 employees, while the calculations from tax database data
show that 49.1 persons are missing from the quota, the deviation is less than 2%. Regarding the
ﬁrms below 50 employees, the number of missing disabled employees estimated from revenues
are 6.33 thousand , while the tax database shows 6.56 thousand, the diﬀerence is 3.5%. The two
data are not comparable one-by-one because potential diﬀerences caused by rounding, but the
less than 2% deviation suggest that the imputation probably does not threaten the validity of
results.
7.3 Appendix C: Parametric RD results
The treatment rule is the following:
D =

1, if empit >= c
0, if empit < c
(2)
(3)
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Where D is the treatment indicator, in our case, the ﬁrm that is subject of the quota-levy
regulation.
The following equation is estimated: speciﬁcation:
disabledi = β0 + β1e˜mpi + δDi + γDe˜mpi + ui
where disabledi:number of disabled employees,empi:total number of employees, e˜mpi = empi− c
The model is estimated in the neighborhood of the cutoﬀ value: empit ∈ [c − h, c + h], in
baseline speciﬁcation: h = 5, c = 20, 25. 23
Table 14: Parametric RDD on disabled employment 2008-2012, c=20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES disemp disemp disemp disemp disemp
YEARS 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
D 0.0264 0.109*** 0.294*** 0.255*** 0.0170
(0.0281) (0.0307) (0.0324) (0.0307) (0.0252)
e˜mp 0.0128*** 0.0161*** 0.0172*** 0.0157*** 0.00974**
(0.00477) (0.00513) (0.00495) (0.00479) (0.00423)
De˜mp 0.0178** 0.000170 -0.00325 0.00128 0.0376***
(0.00847) (0.00931) (0.00971) (0.00921) (0.00765)
Constant 0.106*** 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.131*** 0.0935***
(0.0166) (0.0177) (0.0170) (0.0164) (0.0149)
Observations 8,506 8,154 8,381 8,368 7,947
R-squared 0.022 0.030 0.086 0.080 0.043
D = 1 if empt > 20 sample: 15 <= empt <= 25 and empit 6= 20
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
23Second order polynomial and and cross term of the of the treatment dummy with the the running variable
to capture potential heterogeneous treatment eﬀect proved to be insigniﬁcant perhaps thanks to the relatively
narrow band
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Table 15: parametric RDD on disabled employment 2008-2012, c=25
(1) (2)
VARIABLES disemp disemp
YEARS 2011 2012
D 0.0187 0.298***
(0.0638) (0.0526)
e˜mp 0.0494*** 0.0206**
(0.0117) (0.00908)
De˜mp -0.0272 -0.0170
(0.0190) (0.0156)
Constant 0.545*** 0.263***
(0.0422) (0.0320)
Observations 4,204 4,503
R-squared 0.024 0.059
D = 1 if empt >= 25 sample: 20 <= empt <= 30 and empit 6= 25
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
7.4 Appendix D:Disabled employment in international comparison
Figure 12: Employment rate of disabled/employment of total working age population,2011
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Figure 13: Decomposition of disabled,2011
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Sw
it
ze
rl
an
d
Tu
rk
ey
A
u
st
ri
a
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
R
o
m
an
ia
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
Fi
n
la
n
d
C
yp
ru
s
Sw
ed
en
It
al
y
Sl
o
ve
n
ia
Ic
el
an
d
D
en
m
ar
k
B
el
gi
u
m
P
o
la
n
d
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
gd
o
m
G
re
ec
e
P
o
rt
u
ga
l
EU
C
ro
at
ia
Fr
an
ce
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
La
tv
ia
Sl
o
va
ki
a
G
er
m
an
y
B
u
lg
ar
ia
Ir
el
an
d
H
u
n
ga
ry
Li
th
u
an
ia
Es
to
n
ia
Sp
ai
n
Figure 14: Unemployment rate of disabled,2011
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7.5 Appendix E:Regional and sectoral structure of ﬁrms
Table 16: Regional and sectoral composition of ﬁrms
Regions 15 <= emp < 20 20 < emp < 25 Sectors 15 <= emp < 20 20 < emp < 25
1. 45.6 43.77 A 4.5 6.1
2. 9.7 9.07 B 0.1 0.1
3. 8.9 8.45 C 0.2 0.4
4. 7.8 8.32 D 21.1 23.8
5. 6.8 6.81 E 0.5 0.7
6. 10.2 11.61 F 12.7 10.3
7. 11.0 11.97 G 24.9 22.6
H 7.6 5.3
I 5.6 6.5
J 1.2 1.3
K 16.8 17.0
L 0.0 0.0
M 0.8 0.6
N 1.4 1.8
O 2.6 3.6
7.6 Appendix F:Descriptive statistics
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7.7 Appendix G: Treatment eﬀect heterogeneity, parametric RD results with
interaction terms
The heterogeneity of the treatment eﬀect and was also investigated parametrically, by extending
the naive RD with interaction term of disabled population ratio with the treatment indicator.
Using the labor force survey data (see Table 10), regional dummies were replaced by one
region- speciﬁc variable that captures the share of disabled in total working age population. The
variable is normalized to zero:
dis_popratior = DPrTPr − DPTP , where DPr is working age (15-64 years) disabled population in
a given region and TPr is regional total working age population. I also added average wage and
productivity of the ﬁrm to separate the eﬀect of disabled population ratio from the development
of regions.
The results show that if the share of disabled population ratio is lower, ﬁrms on average
employ less to the quota regulation (see Table 18). The cross-product of the disabled population
ratio with the treatment dummy is signiﬁcantly positive, even after controlling for wage and
productivity diﬀerences, which shows that higher share of disabled population yields higher
disabled employment eﬀect of the quota regulation on ﬁrms. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient
is large: it shows that if the ratio of disabled population is higher by 1 percentage point, the
employment eﬀect is larger by around 0.03. Consequently, the higher disabled population alone
implies more than double treatment eﬀect in the Eastern regions compared to the most developed
Central-Hungary.
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Table 18: RD extended with disabled population ratio(2010 and 2011, ﬁrms with 15-25 employ-
ees)
Table 19: RDD for number of disabled employees ( ﬁrms with 15-25 employees)
(1) (2)
YEARS 2010 2011
VARIABLES disemp disemp
D 0.316*** 0.273***
(0.0327) (0.0317)
emp-c 0.0160*** 0.0166***
(0.00499) (0.00491)
D*(emp-c) 0.00447 0.00592
(0.00980) (0.00949)
lnaverwage -0.0129 0.00531
(0.0171) (0.0160)
lnprod_gdp -0.000925 -0.00976
(0.0101) (0.00989)
D*lnprod_gdp -0.0447** -0.0119
(0.0202) (0.0199)
D*lnaverwage -0.0927*** -0.0852***
(0.0328) (0.0310)
disabled pop.ratio 0.0159*** 0.0150***
(0.00204) (0.00198)
D*disabled pop._ratio 0.0343*** 0.0280***
(0.00392) (0.00379)
Constant 0.249*** 0.191**
(0.0953) (0.0882)
Observations 7,841 7,888
R-squared 0.131 0.117
h=5
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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